spack/var/spack/repos/builtin/packages/glibc/965cb60-2.7.patch
Harmen Stoppels 78132f2d6b
glibc: dont link libgcc_eh.a pre 2.17, and backport at_random auxval patch (#40013)
This resolves an interesting circular dependency between gcc and glibc:

1. glibc < 2.17 depends on libgcc.a and libgcc_eh.a
2. libgcc_eh.a is only built when gcc is configured with
   --enable-shared
3. but building shared libraries requires crt*.o and libc.so

Backport AT_RANDOM auxval changes to avoid dealing with wrong inline 
assembly (fallback code fails on ubuntu 23.04)
2023-09-28 13:30:43 +02:00

175 lines
5.5 KiB
Diff

diff --git a/csu/libc-start.c b/csu/libc-start.c
index a14ed71616..8b3f436f46 100644
--- a/csu/libc-start.c
+++ b/csu/libc-start.c
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ LIBC_START_MAIN (int (*main) (int, char **, char ** MAIN_AUXVEC_DECL),
__pthread_initialize_minimal ();
/* Set up the stack checker's canary. */
- uintptr_t stack_chk_guard = _dl_setup_stack_chk_guard ();
+ uintptr_t stack_chk_guard = _dl_setup_stack_chk_guard (_dl_random);
# ifdef THREAD_SET_STACK_GUARD
THREAD_SET_STACK_GUARD (stack_chk_guard);
# else
diff --git a/elf/dl-support.c b/elf/dl-support.c
index 2c11ac6881..321ed07a18 100644
--- a/elf/dl-support.c
+++ b/elf/dl-support.c
@@ -84,6 +84,9 @@ struct r_scope_elem _dl_initial_searchlist;
int _dl_starting_up = 1;
#endif
+/* Random data provided by the kernel. */
+void *_dl_random;
+
/* Get architecture specific initializer. */
#include <dl-procinfo.c>
@@ -216,6 +219,9 @@ _dl_aux_init (ElfW(auxv_t) *av)
__libc_enable_secure = av->a_un.a_val;
__libc_enable_secure_decided = 1;
break;
+ case AT_RANDOM:
+ _dl_random = (void *) av->a_un.a_val;
+ break;
# ifdef DL_PLATFORM_AUXV
DL_PLATFORM_AUXV
# endif
diff --git a/elf/dl-sysdep.c b/elf/dl-sysdep.c
index 85e331a90f..6ce20b5150 100644
--- a/elf/dl-sysdep.c
+++ b/elf/dl-sysdep.c
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ int __libc_multiple_libcs = 0; /* Defining this here avoids the inclusion
void *__libc_stack_end attribute_relro = NULL;
rtld_hidden_data_def(__libc_stack_end)
static ElfW(auxv_t) *_dl_auxv attribute_relro;
+void *_dl_random attribute_relro = NULL;
#ifndef DL_FIND_ARG_COMPONENTS
# define DL_FIND_ARG_COMPONENTS(cookie, argc, argv, envp, auxp) \
@@ -173,6 +174,9 @@ _dl_sysdep_start (void **start_argptr,
GLRO(dl_sysinfo_dso) = (void *) av->a_un.a_val;
break;
#endif
+ case AT_RANDOM:
+ _dl_random = (void *) av->a_un.a_val;
+ break;
#ifdef DL_PLATFORM_AUXV
DL_PLATFORM_AUXV
#endif
@@ -293,6 +297,7 @@ _dl_show_auxv (void)
[AT_SECURE - 2] = { "AT_SECURE: ", dec },
[AT_SYSINFO - 2] = { "AT_SYSINFO: 0x", hex },
[AT_SYSINFO_EHDR - 2] = { "AT_SYSINFO_EHDR: 0x", hex },
+ [AT_RANDOM - 2] = { "AT_RANDOM: 0x", hex },
};
unsigned int idx = (unsigned int) (av->a_type - 2);
diff --git a/elf/rtld.c b/elf/rtld.c
index 7612a69324..e77ac43713 100644
--- a/elf/rtld.c
+++ b/elf/rtld.c
@@ -1816,7 +1816,7 @@ ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit interface: %s; ignored.\n",
tcbp = init_tls ();
/* Set up the stack checker's canary. */
- uintptr_t stack_chk_guard = _dl_setup_stack_chk_guard ();
+ uintptr_t stack_chk_guard = _dl_setup_stack_chk_guard (_dl_random);
#ifdef THREAD_SET_STACK_GUARD
THREAD_SET_STACK_GUARD (stack_chk_guard);
#else
diff --git a/sysdeps/generic/dl-osinfo.h b/sysdeps/generic/dl-osinfo.h
index 60b84a900d..02ec28d424 100644
--- a/sysdeps/generic/dl-osinfo.h
+++ b/sysdeps/generic/dl-osinfo.h
@@ -1,12 +1,29 @@
#include <stdint.h>
static inline uintptr_t __attribute__ ((always_inline))
-_dl_setup_stack_chk_guard (void)
+_dl_setup_stack_chk_guard (void *dl_random)
{
- uintptr_t ret = 0;
- unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) &ret;
- p[sizeof (ret) - 1] = 255;
- p[sizeof (ret) - 2] = '\n';
- p[0] = 0;
+ uintptr_t ret;
+ if (dl_random == NULL)
+ {
+ ret = 0;
+ unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) &ret;
+ p[sizeof (ret) - 1] = 255;
+ p[sizeof (ret) - 2] = '\n';
+ p[0] = 0;
+ }
+ else
+ memcmp (&ret, dl_random, sizeof (ret));
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static inline uintptr_t __attribute__ ((always_inline))
+_dl_setup_pointer_guard (void *dl_random, uintptr_t stack_chk_guard)
+{
+ uintptr_t ret;
+ if (dl_random == NULL)
+ ret = stack_chk_guard;
+ else
+ memcmp (&ret, (char *) dl_random + sizeof (ret), sizeof (ret));
return ret;
}
diff --git a/sysdeps/generic/ldsodefs.h b/sysdeps/generic/ldsodefs.h
index 958a099b82..c4d2874085 100644
--- a/sysdeps/generic/ldsodefs.h
+++ b/sysdeps/generic/ldsodefs.h
@@ -726,6 +726,9 @@ weak_extern (_dl_starting_up)
extern int _dl_starting_up_internal attribute_hidden;
#endif
+/* Random data provided by the kernel. */
+extern void *_dl_random attribute_hidden;
+
/* OS-dependent function to open the zero-fill device. */
extern int _dl_sysdep_open_zero_fill (void); /* dl-sysdep.c */
diff --git a/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/dl-osinfo.h b/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/dl-osinfo.h
index 082790f63b..d90f228942 100644
--- a/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/dl-osinfo.h
+++ b/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/dl-osinfo.h
@@ -154,22 +154,20 @@ _dl_discover_osversion (void)
} while (0)
static inline uintptr_t __attribute__ ((always_inline))
-_dl_setup_stack_chk_guard (void)
+_dl_setup_stack_chk_guard (void *dl_random)
{
uintptr_t ret;
-#ifdef ENABLE_STACKGUARD_RANDOMIZE
- int fd = __open ("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
- if (fd >= 0)
- {
- ssize_t reslen = __read (fd, &ret, sizeof (ret));
- __close (fd);
- if (reslen == (ssize_t) sizeof (ret))
- return ret;
- }
-#endif
- ret = 0;
- unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) &ret;
- p[sizeof (ret) - 1] = 255;
- p[sizeof (ret) - 2] = '\n';
+ /* We need in the moment only 8 bytes on 32-bit platforms and 16
+ bytes on 64-bit platforms. Therefore we can use the data
+ directly and not use the kernel-provided data to seed a PRNG. */
+ memcpy (&ret, dl_random, sizeof (ret));
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static inline uintptr_t __attribute__ ((always_inline))
+_dl_setup_pointer_guard (void *dl_random, uintptr_t stack_chk_guard)
+{
+ uintptr_t ret;
+ memcpy (&ret, (char *) dl_random + sizeof (ret), sizeof (ret));
return ret;
}